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T here are two concepts in the description of today’s topic that are potentially problematic. The first is “social modernization.” What does it mean to be more or less “modern” in this context? 
Here I turn to an economist and a legal philosopher for inspiration. The 
economist is Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. For decades, economists 
have wrestled with the question of how to measure development. 
Total GDP is singularly uninformative, as it does not distinguish among 
levels of income distribution, resource wealth versus human capital. 
GINI coefficients and other measures of distributive inequality do 
not do much to expand the picture, as they tell us little if anything 
about the social dimensions, such as barriers to women’s economic 
participation, levels of social and economic mobility, and distribution 
of opportunities rather than resources. Sen has pioneered the now 
widely-accepted approach of talking about development in terms of 
“capabilities,” most notably in Development as Freedom (2000). Sen’s 
argument is that we should look for Economic development of a form 
that enhances individuals’ capabilities produce genuinely meaningful 
“freedom” — in classical terms, not merely the freedom from want 
or oppression but genuine freedom for each individual to realize his 
or her potential. Economic development that enhances individual 
capabilities, in turn, results in changes in attitudes that have political 
consequences as a result of transforming social attitudes.
Sen’s ideas have been further developed by the legal philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum, who has helped develop the “human development and 
capabilities approach” to assessing social and economic development. 
This is an approach to measuring development not in terms of 
aggregate GDP, but rather in terms of the range of opportunities for 
transformative self-improvement available to a country’s residents. 
(Creating Capabilities: the Human Development Approach (2011). This 
is not merely a philosophical speculation: elements of the capabilities 
approach to measuring development are today employed by the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations 
Development Progamme, among others. So when I talk about the 
role of constitutional law in social modernization, I am making a very 
value-laden assumption that what we mean is the role of constitutional 
law in expanding the range of opportunities for self-realization by 
individuals.
The second potentially difficult term is “constitutional law.” When 
we talk about constitutional law, we tend to focus on large, structural 
elements of government or grand statements of principle. But that 
misses the dimensions of what might be called “constitutional-law-
in-action.” After all, any number of constitutions contain declarations 
of rights such as free expression or security of property, but exist in 
regimes that provide neither. In Giovanni Sartori’s phrase these are 
“sham constitutions,” because they are not associated with subordinate 
institutions and texts and legal and social practices that would suffice 
to make them real. “Constitutiona law in action” might refer to the 
web of laws and regulations that implement (or fail to implement) 
constitutional principles, the ways in which constitutional language 
is deployed in political debate to challenge existing arrangements, 
the effectiveness with which jurists are able to extrapolate from broad 
constitutional principles to craft meaningful protections for individuals 
or communities, and the way popular constitutional understandings 
strengthen aspects of national identity.
So the question can now be reformulated in a somewhat more precise 
way: what can we learn from looking at foreign examples about the 
role of constitutional-law-in-action in furthering citizens’ capabilities 
and opportunities for self-realization?
It is not possible to explore all the dimensions of that question in 
This article asks us to consider the relationship between constitutional 
law and social development in terms of two particular ways of thinking. 
First, the article proposes that social and economic development 
should be thought about in terms of the «capabilities approach» that 
measures «development» in terms of the expansion of opportunities 
for individuals in the society to realize their potentials. Second, the 
article asks us to think about constitutional law in terms of «law in 
action», meaning the way law works in social and economic practice 
to structure relationships. Constitutional law in action describes the 
way constitutional legal arguments and categories of thinking affect 
social and economic development. The question being addressed can 
therefore be phrased as «what can we learn from looking at foreign 
examples about the role of constitutional-law-in-action in furthering 
citizens’ capabilities and opportunities for self-realization?». Drawing 
on examples from Peru, Israel, and Australia, the article argues that 
constitutional law in action is a critical element in the development 
of capabilities, and needs to be a primary focus for any nation that 
attempts to pursue the goal of social modernization.
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a short time, but three cases point to three different elements that 
should be considered.
1. PERU: ThE FAILURE OF CAPITALISM
In his landmark study, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds 
in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2003), Hernando de Soto looked 
at Peru as well as data from around the world to ask what was missing 
in societies attempted to develop market economies and failed. The 
answers were quite clearly not lack of resources, or lack of effort by 
the people, or an absence of a desire to make money, or even lack 
of skills. DeSoto found the network of laws that convert assets into 
actual capital. In Latin America, three key examples are land reform, 
excessive bureaucracy, and corruption. Land is a valuable asset — but 
only if it is owned so that it can be bought and sold, rented to others, 
or developed in order to produce a source of capital. Even where 
capital exists in forms that permit its exploitation, excessive bureaucracy 
can make it impossible for those who are not already wealthy to get 
started: De Soto documents the number of transactions required to 
open a business in different countries. In the U.S. the number averages 
something like 9; in Peru it is closer to 40. And there is corruption. 
Corruption does not just weaken confidence in markets, it makes a 
mockery of the idea that all citizens have an equal opportunity to 
pursue economic success on equal terms.
What all three of these phenomena have in common is that they 
represent the “constitution in action” element of constitutional law. 
Peru along with the other states de Soto studied in which capitalism 
failed to expand, has a constitution that provides the same kinds 
of guarantees of rights to property ownership, security of contract, 
and protection against government interference that occur in the 
constitutions of Western European states or the U.S. What is missing 
is a set of implementing laws that make those guarantees meaningful. 
Most crucially, as deSoto documents, the burdens do not fall equally. It 
is the poor or the young who are starting out who are most harmed by 
the impossibility of owning land outright, cumbersome bureaucratic 
systems, and corruption. The trends all meet in a phenomenon called “the 
rich get richer.’ Those in whose hands land ownership is concentrated 
rent out their property, producing wealth for themselves and at the 
same time preventing a new generation of potential entrepreneurs 
from ever amassing capital or having an incentive to improve property. 
Bureaucracies can be navigated by those with the resources to hire 
experts — resulting in an ever-greater concentration of licenses, 
government permits, benefits, and other legal prerogative in the 
hands of those who already have the most. And the role of corruption 
in maintaining inequality and preventing socioeconomic mobility is 
obvious and well-documents.
Economically, then, we can look to Latin America and take away 
the lesson that if it is true that social modernization depends on the 
possibility of socioeconomic mobility, constitutional law must be 
translated into constitutional-law-in-action in the form of reforms to 
legislation, business practices, and legal protections for property rights 
before guarantees of “equality” will be made meaningful.
2. ISRAEL: ThE CASE OF ThE MISSINg CONSTITUTION
The State of Israel was founded in 1948. One of the first tasks undertaken 
by the new State’s Parliament was the drafting of a Constitution. That 
project failed because of the inability of the participants to resolve 
disagreements over the role of the Jewish religion in the new state. 
Instead, under the leadership of Justice YizharHarari, the Israeli Parliament 
agreed to adopt a series of Basic Laws with the intention that eventually 
these would be brought together to form a written constitution. More 
than 60 years later, that project has still not been accomplished, and 
indeed most observers agree that it is less likely than ever. 
In the meantime, the “Knesset”(Israeli Parliament) has adopted a 
number of Basic Laws, which have been treated as having constitutional 
force by the Israel Supreme Court.  Moreover, during the period of 
the 1980s and 1990s in particular, the Israel  Supreme Court was very 
aggressive in interpreting these Basic Laws and other texts such as 
the Declaration of Independence of the State to find constitutional 
principles of law (including, for example, substantive judicial review) 
despite the absence of a written text. In particular, economic liberties 
are well defined in the system of Israeli constitutional jurisprudence. 
Nonetheless, a focus on social modernization in the Israeli experience 
demonstrates the futility of attempting to achieve constitution-like 
outcomes without a well-developed system of constitutional-law-in-
action. 
First, the same issue that caused the failure of the constitutional 
project in 1948 persists today. There is no clear understanding of the 
relationship between religious and civil authorities, with the result that 
the religious authorities have great power over the lives of individuals. 
Girls and women, in particular, are denied access to education and kept 
from participating in the economy. Patriarchal social attitudes cannot 
be challenged by appeals to constitutional principles, because there are 
no such principles to which appeal can be made. That is, it is not only 
the case that the civil authorities will not intervene to compel religious 
authorities to provide access to education for girls, for example, it is 
also the case that there is no vocabulary of constitutional principles 
favoring the development of individual capabilities that is available 
in political or public discourse to challenge these practices. This lack 
points to one of the key roles that constitutional-law-in-action plays 
in social modernization. In traditional societies, it is often the case that 
political and legal principles are more “modern” (in the sense I have 
used the term here) than prevalent social practices, particularly in rural 
areas or in poor communities, or among religiously observant groups. 
But unless these principles are expressed in constitutional terms, they 
are not available to challenge the legitimacy of customary practices. 
One of the most powerful ways in which constitutional legal principles 
enable social modernization is in the criticism of the gaps between 
constitutional principles and social practices; that critical vocabulary is 
absent in the Israeli case. Similarly, without a constitutional foundation 
there is no authority on the basis of which laws and regulations can be 
created to push traditional societies toward modernization, such as 
compulsory education laws or reforms of marriage and divorce laws 
administered by religious courts.
Conversely, of course, the existence of formal constitutional guarantees 
of equal opportunity would be meaningless without accompanying 
political attitudes and implementing laws. This is an enormous issue for 
developing economies. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap 
Report of 2012, for example, tracks the continuing strong correlation 
between national economic competitiveness and women’s participation 
in the economy. The reason, simply, is that human capital is not being 
developed. A report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific Countries, for example, found that limited opportunities 
for women cost the region $45 billion (US) in economic development 
every year. (See http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-
report-2012; Kazakhstan’s national ranking falls somewhere between 
30th and 50th in the world between 2006 and 2012, depending on 
the year.) In other words, social modernization understood in terms of 
maximizing opportunities for the development of human capabilities is 
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an economic as well as a political imperative — but achieving that goal 
against the opposition of entrenched traditions requires a powerful 
lever. That lever is provided by a Constitution supported by meaningful 
constitutional-law-in-action — indeed, no other mechanism has yet 
been discovered that has the capacity to transform a political vision 
into a reconception of social roles.
3. AUSTRALIA: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-IN-ACTION wIThOUT 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
The State of Australia has had a written Constitution since its founding 
at the beginning of the 20th Century. What makes the Australian 
Constitution an unusual case, however, is that it contains no Bill of 
Rights and indeed barely guarantees any rights at all. Nonetheless, 
the Australian High Court has historically been able to draw on shared 
understandings of what democratic government requires to draw out 
rights guarantees by implication. So, for example, a clause referring to 
“representative government” has become the basis for a guarantee of 
freedom of political speech and the right to organize political parties. 
Most importantly, in 1992 in Mabo v. Queensland the High Court drew 
on broad political concepts of justice and fairness to establish legal 
authority for Aboriginal title claims for the first time. The High Court’s 
actions did not occur in a vacuum. There was broad popular political 
support for finally granting some recognition to the injustices that 
the Aborigines had suffered, a ruling political party whose ideology 
favored extension of recognition to minority populations, and an 
existing system of property law that could readily accommodate the 
challenges of resolving challenges to legal title that would result in 
a sufficiently fair and transparent manner that all the parties would 
accept the legitimacy of the outcome.
In other words, Mabo was possible because although Australia had 
no constitutional law on the matter, there was a sufficiently developed 
system of constitutional-law-in-action. The significance of this decision 
and its consequences for social modernization cannot be overstated. 
Australia’s historical mistreatment of the Aborigines, and its continuing 
dispossession of their claims to land ownership right up to the 1990s 
have always been the dark underside of Australian history. The resulting 
empowerment of Aboriginal citizens of Australia is thus both a classic 
example of capabilities-oriented development and a powerful if long-
overdue statement of the possibility of providing meaningful equality, 
both driven by the power of constitutional law-in-action.
These three cases offer valuable lessons for understanding the 
relationship between constitutional law and social modernization, 
whether in Kazakhstan or elsewhere. First, constitutional legal 
principles are a necessary but not a sufficient resource to achieve social 
development. Second, it is the way constitutional legal principles are 
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х. Швебер: конституционное право в действии и возможные 
подходы к развитию: уроки Перу, израиля и Австралии.
В статье показана взаимосвязь конституционного права и социаль-
ного развития. автор полагает, что социально-экономическое раз-
витие должно рассматриваться: 1) с учетом термина «возможности 
подхода», определяющего «развитие» с точки зрения расширения 
возможностей для людей, реализации ими своего потенциала, са-
мореализации; 2) с точки зрения «закона в действии» как средства 
формирования отношений. действующий конституционный закон, 
считает автор, описывает способ влияния конституционно-правовых 
аргументов и некоторых категорий мышления на социальное и эко-
номическое развитие. на примерах Перу, Израиля и австралии пока-
зывается, что действующий конституционный закон — важный эле-
мент развития возможностей и социальной модернизации.
Ключевые слова: право, конституция, развитие, способности, срав-
нительная политика, общество, модернизация, демократизация, воз-
можность, экономика.
х. Швебер: «конституциялық құқықіс-әрекетте және дамытуға 
мүмкін тұғырлар: Перу, израиль мен Австралия тағылымы».
Осы мақалада конституциялық құқық пен әлеуметтік даму арасындағы 
өзара арақатынасы қарастырылады. автор әлеуметтік-экономикалық 
дамуды екі ойлау тәсілі жағдайындаталдайды: 1) мақала әлеуметтік-
экономикалық дамуды «тәсілдеме мүмкіндігі» термині шеңберінде 
қарастырылуы жөн екендігін болжамдайды, ол «дамуды» өз әлеуетін 
іске асыру мақсатымен адамдар үшін қоғамда мүмкіндіктерді кеңейту 
жағынан анықтайды; 2) мақала конституциялық құқықты «қолданыстағы 
заң» жағынан, яғни осы заңды әлеуметтік пен экономикалық 
қызметте қатынастарды қалыптастыру мақсатымен қолдану жолы-
мен зерттейді. Қолданыстағы конституциялық заң конституциялық-
құқықтық дәлелдердің мен бірнеше ойлау санаттардың әлеуметтік пен 
экономикалық дамуға ықпал тәсілін бейнелейді. Перу, Израиль мен ав-
стралия үлгілерін негізге ала отырып, қолданыстағы конституциялық 
заң — мүмкіндіктің және әлеуметтік жаңғыртуды дамуының маңызды 
элементі деп көрсетіледі.
түйінді сөздер: құқық, конституция, даму, қабілеттілік, салыстырмалы 
саясат, қоғам, жаңғырту, демакратизация, мүмкіндік, экономика.
realized in ordinary law, political discourse, and popular understandings 
that determines the degree to which they will have the power to 
drive social change. It is rather easy to sit in a conference room or 
a library and draft constitutional provisions; the hard work comes 
in translating those provisions into practices and attitudes among 
citizens and government officials. 
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National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://
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теории и истории государства и права Казгюу
В первые идею «Rule of law» («Верховенство права») исполь-зовал в 1875 г. а.В. дайси для определения одной из осо-бенностей английской конституции в том же значении, ко-
торое он изложил в сборнике лекций по конституционному пра-
ву («An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution»), 
изданном десятилетием позже. Как определил сам автор, глав-
ной целью опубликования этого сборника ставилось обеспече-
ние изучающих право пособием, в котором содержалось бы из-
ложение принципов английского конституционализма в сравне-
нии с конституционализмом сша и французской республики. 
дАйСи и зНАчЕНиЕ Его идЕй
альберт Венн дайси (Albert Venn Dicey, 1835 – 1922) – британский 
юрист, теоретик конституционного права. дайси окончил кол-
ледж «Баллиол» («Balliol College») в Оксфорде, позже стал профес-
сором английского права в Оксфордском университете и веду-
щим теоретиком конституционного права своего времени. дай-
си широко известен как автор труда «Введение в науку Консти-
туционного права» («An Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution»), впервые опубликованного в 1885 г., где изло-
женные им принципы считаются частью современной Британ-
ской конституции.
наиболее известными работами дайси являются: «Conflict of Laws» 
(1896), «A Leap in the Dark, or Our New Constitution» (1893).
В российской литературе начала хх в. феномен верховенства 
права исследовался таким видным ученым, как с.а. Котляревский. 
В частности, он описывает, имеющий место в правовой системе 
англии феномен «господство правового духа» (согласно концеп-
ции дайси, это – одно из трех значений термина «Rule of law»): 
«Она (англия – ж.т.) не имеет писаной конституции вообще: о ее 
основных законах можно говорить не в юридическом, а лишь в 
историческом смысле. К таковым могут быть причислены: Вели-
кая хартия вольностей 1215 г.; статут о неплатеже налогов без 
согласия парламента — т. н. «de tallagio non concedendo» 1297 
г.; петиция о правах 1628 г.; Билль о правах 1689 г.: в этих актах 
провозглашены основные принципы английского публичного 
права. Эти принципы не вытекают из английской конституции; 
напротив, сама она есть результат их постоянного действия, она 
целиком основана на обычае и традиционном преемстве. Имен-
но это обстоятельство, что она не заключается в определенном 
акте, который может быть раз навсегда изучен, а в текучей тра-
диции, сообщает ей своего рода мистический отпечаток, совер-
шенно чуждый новым конституциям, представляющим, так ска-
зать, вполне определенные реальности»1.
значение трудов дайси отмечается и в современной юриди-
ческой литературе. так, известный специалист по истории по-
литической и прававой мысли О. Э. лейст считает, что труд дай-
си «Введение в науку Конституционного права» является боль-
шим вкладом в политологию, т. к. подробно исследует взаимо-
отношения государства и индивида2. 
ричард Косгрув (Richard а.сosgrove) в книге «Верховенство пра-
ва: альберт Венн дайси, юрист Викторианской эпохи» (The rule 
of law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian jurist (1980)) высоко оценива-
ет труд «Введение в науку Конституционного права»3. р. Косгрув 
пишет о дайси как ученом, детально рассмотревшем становле-
ние и развитие английского общего права. р. Косгрув соглаша-
ется с мнением дайси, считавшим, что утверждение «верховен-
ства права» и традиции свободы в англии в конце XIX века были 
В статье рассматриваются размышления известного английского 
теоретика конституционного права альберта Венн дайси (Albert 
Venn Dicey) о концепции «Rule of law», которую он впервые выдви-
нул во второй половине XIX века. автор статьи отмечает три осо-
бенности концепции верховенства права дайси, останавливается 
на особенностях английского конституционализма. также в работе 
отмечается роль и место английских судов в формировании и раз-
витии концепции «Rule of law», предпринимается попытка раскрыть 
сущность основных принципов Британской конституции.
Ключевые слова: альберт Венн дайси, верховенство права, го-
сподство, правовое государство, конституция, закон, обычное пра-
во, суд, английский конституционализм, принципы конституции.
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